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INTRODUCTION 
The present paper investigates how one factor, the public perception of costs and 
benefits of enlargement in the current EU member-states might play a role in 
influencing the form and the content of eastern enlargement. The core of the analysis is 
focused on the demonstration and explanation of discrepancies between the costs and 
benefits of eastern enlargement for the EU and their public perception in the current 
member-states. 
For a long time questions investigating the role of public opinion in the course of 
integration have not figured prominently on the research agenda. The most influential 
theories of integration have ignored public opinion and concentrated on 
intergovernmental bargaining, elites and interest groups. Haas argued that it is “as 
impracticable as it is unnecessary to have recourse to general public opinion surveys, or 
even to surveys of specifically interested groups. (…) It suffices to single out and define 
the political elites in the participating countries, to study their reactions to integration 
and to assess changes in attitude on their part” (1958: 17). Later, in its revisionist phase, 
however, neofunctionalism started to recognise the role that public opinion can play in 
constraining or facilitating integration (Dalton-Eichenberg: 1998). Nye conceived of 
„attitudinal integration‟ as an important element of political integration (1971). The 
more recent history of the EU – the failure of the first Danish referendum on the 
Maastricht treaty and later on EMU, the tight margin of the French referendum on 
Maastricht or the first Irish „no‟ to the Nice treaty – has dramatically proven the 
importance of public support for integration. By now few would disagree with the claim 
that “mass attitudes, through their influence on political behaviour, play an important – 
sometimes crucial – role in determining the content and scope of integration. Through 
channels of mass influence – for example, referenda, representative institutions and 
protest – citizens affect EU policy-making and the success of integrative reforms” 
(Gabel: 1998: 109).  
Despite the recognition of the influence of public opinion on integration the role of 
Western perceptions in the ongoing process of enlargement has not been rigorously 
investigated. Although no referendum will be held on the question of enlargement in 
current member-states, public opinion seems to play an important role in influencing 
the process. Securing the support of West European societies to the accession new 
countries will be necessary to ensure a smooth ratification of accession treaties by the 
national parliaments of current member states. If publics are sceptical, or even hostile 
towards the idea of enlarging the EU to the East, elected politicians may become 
reluctant to promote an unpopular cause. But public support is not only important in the 
last phase of enlargement. The experiences of the accession negotiations show that 
public fears can influence national positions on certain sensitive issues and indirectly 
the EU common position and even the outcome of negotiations. By having an impact on 
the conditions of enlargement public opinion inevitably influences the political and 
social dynamics of a future enlarged Union. 
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The present paper aims to take a step towards filling this gap by bringing real costs and 
benefits of enlargement and the public perception of these costs and benefits into the 
same framework, by pointing out and trying to find explanations for the discrepancies 
between the two, and thereby emphasising the importance of the impact that public 
opinion may have on the form and content of EU-enlargement.  
Section I aims to present a broad categorisation of the aggregate costs and benefits of 
enlargement for the EU. The analysis will differ from several earlier impact studies in 
two crucial aspects. First, in order to get a complete picture, not only the easily 
quantifiable impacts, but also the intangible implications and the costs of non-
enlargement must be taken into account. Given the unquantifiable nature of important 
benefits, qualitative arguments about the magnitude of these impacts offer the most 
appropriate method of analysis, despite the inevitable subjective element involved 
(Weimer-Vining: 1992). Second, the timeframe of the analysis must be extended to 
include all costs and benefits associated with enlargement. Thus I will consider as 
benefits the gains, including the ones already realised that would be reversed if the 
enlargement project failed, and count as costs those losses that accrue to the EU as a 
result of enlargement, excluding those that would have to be faced even without 
enlargement. I am aware of the possible criticism that can be voiced against calling any 
sort of cost-benefit calculation „real‟ or „objective.‟ My analysis is built on several 
sources projecting the expected impacts of enlargement. All exercises of analysing 
costs and benefits may, however, be influenced by the ideological orientation and the 
political goals of the experts conducting them. At the same time, since prior to the full 
realisation of the enlargement project we can have no fully objective sources for 
measuring its „real‟ costs and benefits, a critical reliance on existing sources is 
inevitable if one tries to take a position on the net cost-benefit balance of enlargement 
in order to compare and contrast it with the public perception of costs and benefits. 
Section II will present and analyse the public perception of the costs and benefits of 
enlargement in the current member-states. Attempt is made to fit survey data in the 
categories set out in Section I to ensure maximum comparability. Since the questions of 
the surveys are predetermined and open-ended questions (where respondents can freely 
express their opinion) are rare, the percentage distribution of answers presented in 
Section II shows how widespread perceptions concerning enlargement are, but not the 
intensity of these beliefs or the salience of the different issues. Thus the importance of 
specific hopes and fears in defining people‟s overall stance on the question of 
enlargement has to be inferred from speculative analysis of the results. The source of 
the data presented in this section is the Standard (and Special) Eurobarometer survey 
series, which are conducted in member-states at least half-yearly on behalf of the 
European Commission. These surveys are based on face-to-face interviews and use 
approximately 1000-people multi-stage random (probability) samples representing the 
population aged 15 years and over in each member-state
1
. In addition, in November 
                                              
1
 The sample size is different in Germany (2000), Luxemburg (600), and United Kingdom (1300, including 300 in 
Northern Ireland).  
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2002 an ad hoc thematic survey based on telephone interviews has also been carried out 
in the topic of enlargement (Flash Eurobarometer). The result of this survey is referred 
to in the text, but direct comparison with the results of the Standard Eurobarometer 
survey is avoided given the differences in methodology. The timing of the surveys 
presented on the graphs and in the text refers to the timing of data collection (and not 
the timing of the publication of the results).
2
  
Section III demonstrates and explains the contrast between the real and perceived cost-
benefit balance of enlargement. The discrepancy between real and perceived benefits is 
demonstrated in two ways: firstly, by contrasting variation of net (political and 
economic) benefits from enlargement with variation of public support to enlargement in 
the current member-states; and secondly, by presenting an aggregate „qualitative 
balance sheet‟ of real and perceived impacts of enlargement for the EU, constructed on 
the basis of conclusions from Sections I and II. Four different types of explanation of 
the discrepancies between the real and perceived cost-benefit balance will, in turn, be 
presented. The Conclusion summarises the main findings of the analysis and 
emphasises the dangers that the interconnectedness of lack of public support for 
enlargement with interest group action and lack of political commitment may pose on 
the process of enlargement. 
                                              
2
 The abbreviation used in the charts to denote current member-states are based on the name of the country in its own 
language following the convention used by Eurobarometer reports: A-Austria, B-Belgium, D-Germany, DK-Denmark, 
E-Spain, F-France, FIN-Finland, GR-Greece, I-Italy, IRL-Ireland, L-Luxemburg, NL-Netherlands, P-Portugal, S-
Sweden, UK-United Kingdom. 
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I. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF EASTERN ENLARGEMENT 
1. BENEFITS 
1.1. POLITICAL BENEFITS 
Arguably the most important (and also unquantifiable) benefits of enlargement for the 
EU are the (geo)political impacts of the membership of CEECs.  “Politics is the driving 
force behind Eastern nations‟ desire to join and incumbents‟ desire to have them. These 
considerations – political anchorage and security guarantees – are intrinsically vague, 
since they are based on fears of future developments.” (Baldwin: 1994: 97) 
EU-membership of CEECs is expected to serve as a security guarantee in the broad 
sense (including political, economic, social and environmental stability). By offering a 
framework for cooperation the EU internalises security threats making it easier to solve 
them (Mayhew: 1998). For incumbent member-states this security guarantee is 
essential, since instability in CEECs would have significant spillover effects on the 
West. 
The EU serves as a ‘modernisation anchor’ (Inotai: 1997) and the prospect of 
membership as a ‘commitment device’ for CEECs. The tasks to be fulfilled for entry 
have tied the hands of CEE governments, keeping them on the path of democratic and 
market reforms. The promise of eventual accession helped to secure social acceptance 
of painful reforms and to safeguard them from the influence of vested interests by 
increasing the costs of deviating from the reform path  (Baldwin: 1994). Thus 
integration aids the processes of democratisation and modernisation bringing about 
economic and political predictability and stability in the region benefiting not only 
CEECs, but the EU as well (Bertelsmann: 1998).  
Admitting the ten CEECs will – in the long run – considerably raise the power and 
prestige of the EU in the world.  
These (geo)political and security benefits are unquantifiable but arguably at least as 
important as the economic benefits. The political benefits are inextricably linked to the 
high costs of non-enlargement, that Baldwin termed „fears of future development‟ (see 
Section 3 on the costs of non-enlargement).  
1.2. ECONOMIC BENEFITS 
Several influential studies claim that the economic benefits of eastern enlargement to 
the EU are small, whereas those to CEECs are big (e.g. Baldwin: 1997, Bofinger: 
1995). Although the asymmetry in terms of economic weight between CEECs and the 
EU is evident – the CEECs would only add 7% to the EU‟s GDP (Grabbe: 2001) – the 
importance of economic gains to the EU is often underestimated. The main reason for 
this is that gains from trade liberalisation resulting from Europe Agreements (EA) are 
often considered to be independent of the enlargement process, and are not taken into 
account in the cost-benefit balance. These gains can only be made irreversible through 
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enlargement, thus the timeframe of our analysis must be extended to the whole pre-
accession period (Bertelsmann 1998).  
The EU has significantly improved its trade balance with CEECs during the 1990s 
despite the asymmetric nature of liberalisation favouring the applicants. This was a 
result of the limitations on trade liberalisation in some „sensitive sectors‟ in which 
CEECs had comparative advantage. The possibility of recourse to contingent 
protection, anti-dumping and safeguard measures also had a restrictive impact on CEE 
exports (Faini-Portes: 1995). The much higher trade gains to the EU are clearly shown 
by the development of the EU trade balance with CEECs: In 1989 the EU had a small 
trade deficit with CEECs. Between 1992-1997 the EU realised a surplus of ECU64 
billion, which, although exports to CEECs only made up less than 10% in the EU‟s total 
exports, accounted for 83% of the EU‟s total trade surplus (Inotai: 1998). Taking into 
account the development of EU exports to CEECs and their share in the EU-GDP, it is 
estimated that approximately 0.27% point of the EU‟s yearly growth can be attributed 
to growth of CEE markets (Inotai: 1999).  
Despite the fact that significant gains from trade have already been realised, further 
trade benefits will accrue to the EU from the extension of the Single Market. Most 
of the gains that have been realised so far resulted from allocation effects, whereas 
significant accumulation effects are still to be expected (Baldwin: 1997). There are 
several reasons for concluding that the trade potential of CEECs has by far not been 
exhausted yet. The growth in foreign direct investment (FDI) resulting from the decline 
in risk premia will increase CEE growth, which will stimulate demand for imports from 
the EU, especially demand for capital goods and services in which CEECs are relatively 
underdeveloped (Mayhew: 1998). Economic modernisation in CEECs, increase in 
consumers‟ purchasing power due to revaluation of national currencies and growth in 
real wages will further enhance demand for imports (Bertelsmann: 1998). Larger EU-
transfers to CEECs after accession will also increase CEE demand for EU imports both 
directly, through the „leakage effect‟ estimated by the Commission to be around 25-
35% (EC: 1996), and indirectly, through generating long-term growth leading, in turn, 
to growing import demand. Opening up so far restricted trade (e.g. in agriculture) will 
bring both static and dynamic benefits. A Bertelsmann study (1998), based upon 
calculations using a gravity model, estimates the total untapped trade potential of 
CEECs around 20-50%, contributing to 0.1-0.5% of additional yearly growth in the EU. 
Enlargement brings new investment opportunities and production locations. With 
the certainty of enlargement and the micro- and macroeconomic consolidation it 
requires, CEECs are increasingly becoming safe places to invest. As a result, the risk 
premium is declining, generating new investment opportunities, and making investment 
projects more profitable (Baldwin: 1997). CEECs have offered attractive production 
locations for EU-businesses due to their cheap but relatively qualified labour force. 
Outsourcing labour-intensive production to CEECs provides efficiency gains and 
increased opportunities for intra-industrial division of labour increasing the comparative 
advantage of the EU (Bertelsmann: 1998). Also with the development of the skill and 
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technology levels of candidate countries investments based on high value added 
production can be attracted to the new CEE member-states. 
The enlarged Single Market, the complete liberalisation of trade and the extension of 
investment opportunities all contribute to the increased competitiveness of the EU. 
Higher competition, growing scale economies, enhanced specialisation, increased 
flexibility and productivity through restructuring not only strengthen the EU‟s 
competitiveness in the world, but also bring – through wider choice and lower prices – 
important benefits to consumers.  
The most widely accepted calculation of economic benefits of eastern enlargement 
estimated the gains from reduction of trading costs around ECU9.8-11.1 billion (0.2% 
of the GDP) for the EU  (Baldwin: 1997).
3
 This model, however, has not taken into 
account gains from trade already realised and only included seven CEECs in the 
calculation. 
2. COSTS 
2.1. POLITICAL COSTS 
Three main types of political concerns have been voiced about eastern enlargement. 
The first is related to costs of reforming EU institutions (partially completed by the 
Nice European Council) and redistribution mechanisms. Linked to the issue of reforms, 
the fear of mainly small countries of the changing balance of power within the EU is 
not an aggregate cost, since it is a benefit for bigger countries that in the past have been 
proportionately strongly underrepresented in the decision-making process.  
The second type of political fears are foreign policy concerns:  It is often claimed that 
by admitting CEECs the EU would isolate Russia and the other „outs‟ increasing 
instability at its new Eastern borders. This worry is inextricably linked to questions 
about possible mechanisms for stabilising the rest of the continent in the absence of 
credible commitment to granting membership. Thirdly, there are worries that 
broadening the EU might prevent further deepening by reinforcing a multi-tier EU 
and potentially leading to a dilution of the community.  
These three arguments are much less about real costs of enlargement than about 
potential risk factors that become costs only if enlargement is not handled properly. If 
they are taken into consideration and an appropriate enlargement strategy is developed, 
they are more likely to be benefits. Enlargement, by increasing the urgency of reforms, 
may act as a catalyst inducing desired policy changes. Enlargement further increases the 
need to shift from unanimity to qualified majority voting. This will undoubtedly make 
decision-making more efficient, although it must be recognised that on some views of 
legitimacy the loss of veto power of member-states may be perceived as a cost. 
Enlargement can also further the goal of enhancing Europe-wide stability and improved 
                                              
3
 Based on an estimated 10% reduction in trading costs and 15% reduction in the risk premium. The margin of error of 
this and other projections is necessarily substantial. 
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bilateral relations between EU-members and their neighbours, if a more clear foreign 
policy is developed for handling relations with countries remaining temporarily or 
permanently outside EU-borders. New member states may play an important and 
constructive role in defining this new neighbourhood policy of the EU. As previous 
rounds of accessions have proved, widening can often contribute to further deepening 
(e.g. link between enlargements and setting up and enhancing redistribution as a main 
pillar of integration). Thus, although these arguments present important dangers that in 
certain circumstances may increase the costs of enlargement, for the purposes of the 
present analysis they are classified as risk factors and not as real costs necessarily 
associated with enlargement.  
2.2. ECONOMIC COSTS 
2.2.1. Budgetary costs 
Earlier analyses of the implications of enlargement (and the recent political and public 
debate) have tended to concentrate predominantly on the budgetary costs for the EU. 
Retrospectively it seems clear that most of these calculations overestimated the 
budgetary costs of extending the CAP and the Structural Funds to CEECs (e.g. 
Anderson-Tyers: 1993, Courchene: 1993, Baldwin: 1994, Dresdner Bank: 2001). 
Baldwin (1994) for example calculated the budgetary costs of a hypothetical 1999 
Visegrád4
4
 enlargement to 74% of the EU‟s budget. There are two main reasons for the 
overly high estimations of costs: Firstly, most early (and even some relatively recent) 
calculations were based on the assumption that the present rules of redistribution will be 
extended to CEECs. Secondly, estimates were calculated with the level of development 
of CEECs registered in the early 1990s, not taking into account the substantial growth 
they have and are likely to experience prior to accession. 
The EU faced three clear-cut alternatives of financing enlargement: Increasing the EU-
budget substantially to include new members under current rules would have been 
supported by both current net-beneficiaries and CEECs, but it was opposed by net-
payer countries. Redistributing transfers from current recipients to accession countries 
would have gained the support of net-payers and CEECs, but it was opposed by current 
beneficiaries. Finally, keeping the current system for the incumbents, while excluding 
CEECs from (most) transfers is the alternative that would not hurt the interests of 
present net-payers and net-recipients, but was highly undesirable for CEECs. Out of the 
three actors it is only the CEECs that had no formal voting power on the outcome. It is 
thus not surprising that the final budgetary deal agreed in Copenhagen (as well as the 
earlier Agenda 2000 proposal, the 1999 Berlin decision based upon it, and the January 
2002 proposal of the Commission on the common financial framework of enlargement) 
is in many ways closest to the third alternative.  
The budgetary conditions of enlargement – agreed in Copenhagen on 13 December 
2002 – clearly undermined the direct validity of earlier cost estimations. The total 
                                              
4
 Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland. 
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financial commitments allocated for the 10 new member-states between 2004-2006 are 
Euro 40.8 billion (European Commission: 30 December 2002a). This is Euro 1.8 
million below the ceiling agreed for enlargement (originally planned for six countries) 
at the Berlin European Council in 1999. EU-support allocated to the new member-states 
over the first three years will be on average a yearly Euro 58.5 per capita in the ten new 
countries, with averages ranging from a high of Euro 129 per capita for Lithuania to a 
low of Euro 25 per capita for the Czech Republic (calculated from Bruxinfo: 19 
December 2002).  These per capita yearly transfers are far less than the amounts 
allocated for the current cohesion countries. In 2000 Greece received Euro 437 per 
capita, Ireland Euro 418 per capita, Spain Euro 216 per capita and Portugal Euro 211 
per capita (Grabbe: December 2002). 
The total net budgetary costs for the EU in the first three years, however, are much 
lower, since new joiners also have to pay a contribution to the EU-budget. This 
payment in the 2004-06 period will be around Euro 15 billion. Additionally – given 
existing experiences in current member-states with structural funds, the requirement of 
co-financing and the deficiencies in institutional preparation for the use of funds – the 
candidates may well be unable to use all transfers allocated to them from the budget. As 
a result, the net cost of enlargement is estimated by the Commission to be around Euro 
10.3 billion between 2004-2006, amounting to less than one-thousandth of EU-GDP 
(Grabbe: December 2002). Even including the Phare-aid allocated to CEECs up to 2000 
(a total of Euro 10 billion for 13 countries) and the yearly Euro 3.1 billion pre-accession 
aid (from Phare, ISPA and SAPARD) allocated for the 10 CEEC from the year 2000 
would not increase substantially the total budgetary costs of enlargement for the EU 
(European Commission: 11 February 2003). 
Concerning the Structural Funds, an earlier reform ensuring the longer term limitation 
of transfers to future member-states was the introduction of the absorption capacity 
criteria (EC: 1997). Limiting the receipts of less developed countries to 4% of their 
GDP helps to solve absorption issues and increases the efficiency of transfers, but 
contradicts the goal of decreasing disparities by giving richer cohesion countries more 
transfers than their poorer counterparts (Grabbe-Hughes: 1998b). Despite the fact that 
almost the entire area of CEECs would qualify for Objective 1 and that after the 1999 
reform of Structural Funds 69.7% of total allocation goes to this objective, CEECs were 
allocated to receive around 19% of the total funds committed for Structural Actions 
between 2004-2006 (calculated from European Commission: 11 February 2003). This 
largely reflects the January 2002 proposal of the European Commission on the 
Common Financial Framework of Enlargement, which suggested a three-year transition 
period in the extension of EU regional policy to CEECs under which transfers could 
gradually increase (European Commission: 30 January 2002). 
Transfers to CEECs are usually considered to be pure costs to net-payers and pure 
benefits to recipients. “Participation in the Union‟s distributional schemes is a clear 
case of a zero-sum game. The incumbents lose what the new members gain.” (Bofinger: 
1995: 10) – Arguments such as this ignore the previous experiences of the Structural 
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Funds. Upward convergence enhances EU-wide economic growth, thus indirectly 
benefiting net-payer countries as well. Transfers, through the already mentioned 
leakage effect, give a direct boost to the economy of net-payer countries. Without the 
boost from economic growth from transfers the CEECs may not be able to maintain the 
level of imports from the EU15, which has led to a significant trade surplus benefiting 
the EU. 
Concerning the CAP, the Copenhagen deal (again closely in line with the January 2002 
Commission proposal) left CEECs even worse off in comparison with incumbent 
member-states. The new countries will receive 25% of the direct payments going to 
EU-farmers in 2004, and yearly payments reach the level offered to existing member-
states only after a transition period of 10 years. Despite the fact that CEECs taken 
together are four times as agricultural as the EU15 if we consider the share of the sector 
in the GDP (6.8%), and even more so if we consider the share of the agricultural 
workers in the total workforce (21.2%, EC, 1998), the total agricultural commitment 
(including both CAP and rural development) allocated for the 10 new countries 
between 2004-2006 constitutes only 7% of the total agricultural budget for the enlarged 
EU during this period (calculated from European Commission: 11 February 2003).  
Given the above numbers the critical evaluation of the Copenhagen budgetary deal even 
by experts and officials from the EU is not surprising. Grabbe from the Centre for 
European Reforms described the Copenhagen deal as reflecting the “EU‟s lack of 
generosity [which] will make the deal harder to sell in the 2003 referendum campaigns 
in Central and Eastern Europe” (Grabbe: December 2002: 1). Even Eneko Landaburu, 
the European Commission‟s director general for enlargement admitted that “more 
generosity on the part of current members would have better served the smooth 
integration of candidate countries and would have better enabled them to meet their 
future obligations” (quoted in Bruxinfo: 23 December 2002). 
2.2.2. Non-budgetary costs 
Some specific fears concerning the accession of CEECs occupy at least as important a 
place in the enlargement debate as the budgetary costs. At closer analysis most of these 
fears – although seemingly motivated by economic considerations –turn out to be 
politically highly sensitive issues with little economic rationale. 
The question of free movement of labour occupied a central place in the enlargement 
debate until 2001. There are strong fears (especially in Germany and Austria) that mass 
migration of workers from CEECs to current member-states would follow 
enlargement. Numerous studies and forecasting models have been all suggesting a low 
immediate flow after accession (estimates vary between 70,000 and 240,000, see 
summary of several calculations in European Commission, 2001) and a low long-run 
migration potential of CEECs (around 1%, ibid). Data on migration flows following the 
accession of Spain and Portugal, where similar fears of migration justified a seven-year 
transition period imposed on the movement of labour, demonstrated that these two 
countries experienced net immigration, as a result of return migration of their nationals 
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prompted by the improvement of economic prospects due to membership (European 
Commission, 2001). The limited net migration following enlargement would actually 
provide a partial solution to the serious social problems resulting from the aging of the 
societies of incumbent member-states and the resulting crisis in the functioning of their 
pension system. Studies prove that the net migration that would be needed in order to 
keep working age population in the EU at a stable level is significantly higher than the 
migration flows that could be expected from CEECs after enlargement (UN Study 
quoted in European Commission, 2001). 
Arguments about growing unemployment due to relocation of industries and 
concerns about CEE (wage) competition also seem unfounded. New investments are 
likely to be prompted by the additional demand of new markets. CEE production 
locations are usually not alternatives to keeping production in the EU, but to locating it 
in other low-cost regions (Mayhew: 1998). Liberalisation, trade growth, increasing 
specialisation and the labour cost advantages of CEECs – through increasing the global 
competitiveness of the EU – are more likely to create jobs in the EU (Inotai: 1999). 
Contrary to existing fears, Austrian and German calculations show that the opening 
towards the east has increased net employment in these countries (WIFO: 1997; 
German Institute for Economic Research: 1997). A calculation of the Centre for 
European Reform (2001) estimates that enlargement will create 300,000 jobs in current 
member-states. Part of the reason behind fears of competition is the significant wage 
difference between CEECs and the EU-average, particularly Austria and Germany. A 
big portion of this 1:10 wage gap, however, is due to productivity differentials and 
exchange rates (Grabbe: 2001). Also existing substantial wage differentials between 
EU-countries (1:5 between Portugal and Denmark) have failed to result in significant 
wage competition through labour migration in current member-states.  
Other fears sometimes associated with enlargement include the worry about increasing 
environmental pollution and growing organised crime. These dangers are 
independent of enlargement and are much easier to fight in the framework of an 
enlarged EU.  
3. COSTS OF NON-ENLARGEMENT 
The scale of political and economic benefits only become clear if the costs of non-
enlargement are recognised. If enlargement was seriously delayed or did not take place, 
not only potential future benefits would be unrealised and budgetary costs saved, but 
also benefits secured in the past would be reversed and new serious security costs may 
emerge. 
Guggenbuhl (1995) argued that the motivation of the EU to enlarge is “essentially 
political and aimed at eliminating negative externalities.” Whereas the previous 
discussion aimed to demonstrate that the union has important economic gains to from 
enlargement at low budgetary costs, it can be argued that the most significant benefit of 
enlargement is the realisation of political benefits by avoiding the potential costs 
associated with non-enlargement. If the EU failed to enlarge or indefinitely delayed 
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enlargement, the commitment device function of the prospect of accession would be 
lost, decreasing the incentive of CEECs to reform, and increasing chances of domestic 
opposition to socially painful measures of transformation. This could increase populism 
in CEECs and might lead to political and economic destabilisation, slow-down or 
reversal of democratisation, increasing ethnic tensions, or even political and military 
upheaval (Baldwin: 1997). Destabilisation would have significant negative spillover 
effects on the EU. Resulting political costs to the EU would include loss of credibility, 
loss of foreign policy influence and weakening security due to fragile neighbours. 
These would in turn lead to significant economic costs in the form of growing 
expenditure on reinforced border controls, stabilisation measures, foreign aid and 
potential military intervention.  
The economic costs of losing the already secured but reversible benefits of enlargement 
would be significant: loss of investment opportunities, profitable production locations, 
trade, markets, employment opportunities, all resulting in loss of global competitiveness 
(Bertelsmann: 1998). The most important economic fear concerning enlargement, the 
fear of mass migration, would be much more likely to realise if the vanishing prospect 
of accession increased uncertainty and worsened economic prospects in CEECs 
(Grabbe: 2001). 
4. NET COST-BENEFIT BALANCE 
The above discussion of costs and benefits boils down to the following rudimentary 
cost-benefit balance:
5
 In view of the high costs of non-enlargement, the political 
benefits of enlargement – peace and security in Europe, irreversible democratic and 
market reforms in CEECs – are substantial. The economic gains – taking into account 
the already realised gains from trade liberalisation and the long-run beneficial effect of 
CEE growth on the EU‟s economy and competitiveness – are certainly not negligible 
and significantly greater than assumed by short-term cost-benefit calculations. There 
are no major political costs that could be avoided by non-enlargement. The net 
budgetary costs between 2004-2006 amount to Euro 10.3 billion. Pre-accession aid 
from 1989 up to 2003 constitutes an approximate Euro 22 billion of additional 
budgetary costs (including also countries that will not join the EU in 2004). Most non-
budgetary economic fears are either unfounded (e.g. migration) or related to global 
processes, not to enlargement (e.g. higher competition).  
Thus the net balance can be derived by comparing political and economic benefits with 
budgetary costs. As we have seen above, the total budgetary cost of enlargement 
including both pre-accession aid up to 2003 and the net costs expected between 2004 
and 2006 (a total of Euro 32.3 billion) is about the half of trade surplus already realised 
by the EU between 1992-97 (ECU64 billion), even if we do not consider the equally 
                                              
5
 Here my attempt is aimed at drawing a crude aggregate net cost-benefit balance. The crucial question of the 
distribution of costs and benefits and the role of particularistic as opposed to aggregate impacts will be addressed 
in Section III.2.3. 
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positive trade balance for the EU after 1997. The estimated net economic benefits for 
the EU of a CEEC7 accession (ECU9.8-11 billion, Baldwin: 1997) further increases the 
positive economic gains for the EU. One possible approach to quantifying the hardly 
monetisable value of peace is to measure it in terms of „willingness to pay‟ (Boardman: 
1996), considering the Cold War defence spending of the Western block as the price 
attached to peace (Grabbe: 2001). Using this measure clearly turns the overall balance 
into large net positive gains for the EU. 
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II. PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF COSTS AND BENEFITS 
1. BENEFITS 
1.1. POLITICAL BENEFITS 
Most people see the primary political benefit of enlargement in the reunification of 
Europe. The historic and moral rationale motivating the enlargement project thus 
seems to be widely accepted not only among some high level political advocates of 
enlargement, but also among the European public at large. As revealed by a recent 
telephone survey, two thirds of the EU-public agrees with the statement that “we have a 
moral duty to re-unite Europe after the divisions of the Cold War,” and the same 
number of people also share the opinion that “new countries joining the European 
Union is historically and geographically natural and therefore justified” (Flash 
Eurobarometer 132/2: November 2002).  Both of these opinions, interestingly, are most 
likely to be shared by the societies of the less developed member-states (Spain, Ireland, 
Portugal, Greece and also Italy), who themselves have benefited from their countries‟ 
EU-membership. Societies of the richer – and therefore net-payer member-states – are 
least likely to agree with statements concerning the EU‟s moral duty to enlarge or the 














because it reunites our continent
Europe will be culturally richer
with more member-countries
The more member-countries within the EU,
the more important it will be in the world
Enlargement secures peace
in our part of the world
Enlargement is important because it will help
eliminate armed conflicts in Europe
The more countries there are in the EU, the
more peace and security will be guaranteed
Agree
Disagree
Sources: Special EB56.3: January-February, 2002, EB57: Spring 2002, EB58: Autumn 2002
PERCEPTION OF POLITICAL BENEFITS
 
The majority of EU-societies also recognise several of the more „selfish‟ political 
motivations behind enlargement. 64% are of the view that enlargement enhances the 
cultural richness of the EU and 63% agrees that enlargement leads to increasing 
political importance of the EU in the world,. Somewhat less people, although still 
clear majorities are aware of the security guarantee aspect of enlargement: people 
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believe that it will help to secure peace (60%) and to eliminate armed conflict (57%) in 
Europe. 51% also agree that the more countries enter the EU, the more peace and 
security will be guaranteed.  
1.2. ECONOMIC BENEFITS 
The favourable impact of enlargement on economic growth and the benefits to West 
European enterprises are the only major economic benefits recognised by the majority 
of the EU-public. The small group expecting personal benefits from enlargement (10% 
of the population, see section 3 below) base their evaluation primarily on the expected 
better economic prospects in an enlarged Single Market (Special EB55.0: Spring 
2001). 
The EU-public is unaware or unconvinced about other economic benefits of 
enlargement. Despite the benefits to consumers spelled out in Section I.1.2, the relative 
majority does not expect improvement in the quality of life of people. Equally, the 













Companies in our country will benefit
from enlargement
Enlargement improves quality of life
in the EU




Sources: Special EB56.3, January-February 2002




2.1. POLITICAL COSTS 
Most expectations concerning the political costs of enlargement concern the 
increasingly slow decision-making and growing bureaucracy (66%), and the 
resulting need for reform (58%), due to the increasing number of member-states. 
Related fears (mainly among the societies of relatively small countries) concern the 
changing balance of power (53%), i.e. the growing influence of big member-states at 
the expense of smaller ones. 
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Cultural and national interest based fears are relatively weak. More people disagree 
than agree with statements concerning the loss of national identity and culture or the 












it will be more difficult to make
decisions on European scale
The EU must reform the way
its institutions work before
welcoming new members
Decisions will be imposed by
big member countries
Our national identity and
culture will be weakened
After enlargement our country
will become less important
Agree Disagree
Source: EB57: Spring 2002,  EB58: Autumn 2002
PERCEPTION OF POLITICAL COSTS
 
2.2. ECONOMIC COSTS 
2.2.1. Budgetary costs  
Fears concerning budgetary implications of enlargement are widespread among EU-
publics and vary depending on whether the country in question is net-payer or net-
beneficiary of the EU-budget. An absolute majority of EU-societies fear that 
enlargement will cost too much to existing member-states (53%). Another 
expression of the same fear is the worry of more than half of the EU‟s population 
(including around two thirds of the population of net-receiver countries, such as Ireland 
or Portugal) that enlargement will entail loss of EU-transfers. The other side of the 
coin is the fear of the other almost half of the population, that in the future rich 
countries have to pay more for the others. Understandably especially the population of 
richer and net-contributor countries (Germany, France, Luxemburg and the 
Netherlands) worry about the costs of enlargement and the growing burden of rich 
countries.  












































the EU costs member
countries too much money 
Once new countries have
joined the EU, our country
will receive less financial aid
Richer countries will have
to pay more for the others
Future member-countries
should receive EU financial
aid to prepare to join
Enlargement will not
cost more to existing
member-countries 
Source: EB48-58:1997-2002
PERCEPTION OF BUDGETARY COSTS
 
Given these worries of the citizens in both relatively poor and rich member-states, it is 
not surprising that the majority does not approve of financial aid to help CEECs prepare 
for accession, and disagrees with the statement that enlargement will not put additional 
budgetary costs on their country.  
Most public fears concerning the budgetary costs of enlargement have grown stronger 
over time, despite the series of decisions of the EU and the outcome of accession 
negotiations demonstrating both the unwillingness of the EU to extend the same rules of 
redistribution to new countries after their accession and the resulting low budgetary 
expenditures appropriated for financing enlargement. As recently as November 2002, 
65% of EU-societies held the view that enlargement would be very expensive for their 
countries, and only 28% had no such fears (Flash Eurobarometer 132/2). 
The extreme importance attached to the question of financing enlargement is also 
shown by public attitudes concerning various criteria that candidate countries should 
meet in order to be allowed to join the EU. An overwhelming majority (84%) of the 
EU-public agrees with the statement that in order for a new country to be allowed to 
enter the EU “its joining should not be costly for existing member-states” (Special 
EB56.3: January-February 2002). Similarly, 85% hold the view that new countries have 
to be able to pay their share of the EU-budget (EB56: autumn 2001). 
2.2.2. Non-budgetary costs: Migration and unemployment  
Probably the most important group of fears are the ones related to migration from 
CEECs to the incumbent member-states after enlargement. A very high proportion 
(78%) expects the growth of migration flows after the accession of the candidate 
countries, 48% projecting significant, 30% limited increase in the number of migrants. 
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Especially people in Germany and Greece expect significant growth in immigration 
(Special EB56.3: January-February 2002). An overwhelming majority (70%) of those 
expecting an important growth of migration find it a negative phenomenon, including 
more than four fifth of Austrian, Dutch and Greek respondents. The fact that the 
percentage of uncertain answers to this question is clearly lower (12% on average) than 
to most other questions related to enlargement (20-25%) shows the extreme emotional 
importance of the question of migration in the overall evaluation of enlargement and the 




































































Source: Special EB56.3: January-February 2002
EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION AFTER ENLARGEMENT
(among those expecting an important increase in migration)
 
Societies with the most positive (or rather the least negative) evaluation of migration 
from the new member-states are to be found in Ireland, Spain, Italy and Portugal – all 
of them are sending rather than receiving countries of migrant workers. 
Analysing reasons cited by the respondents who claimed to see migration to their 
country as a negative phenomenon reinforces the conclusion about the high importance 
of the question of migration in public perceptions of enlargement. More than seven out 
of ten people backed up their negative stance by arguing that migration will result in 
increased unemployment. Six out of ten expects the rise of criminality as a result of 
the growing number of migrants, and 57% are of the view that there are already too 
many immigrants in their country (a further 31% mentions in general that there are too 
many people). Other widespread fears concern growing social problems and a parallel 
decrease in living standards, growing racism and intolerance, the development of a 
black market for labour and decreasing wage levels as a result of the presence of 
foreigners willing to accept lower wages (Special EB56.3: January-February 2002). 
















0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Unemployment will rise
Criminality will grow
Already too many immigrants in the country
More social problems / our living standards will decrease
Some will abuse social advantages
Racism and intolerance will rise
Black market for labour will develop
Foreigners will accept lower salaries
It is too costly / we do not have the money to help them
We should help their countries, so that they stay at home
There will be a lack of appartments
Already too many people in our country
We will lose our cultural identitiy
Economic prospects will deteriorate
We should first consolidate the current EU
REASONS FOR NEGATIVE EVALUATION OF MIGRATION FROM NEW MEMBER-STATES
Source: Special EB56.3: January-February 2002  
These fears are widespread among the whole EU-public, not only among those 
considering migration a negative phenomenon: 65% of EU-societies fears the growth of 
drug trafficking and organized crime, another 65% is afraid of the growth of 
unemployment and 55% worries about the loss of social benefits. Societies of potential 
receiving countries are especially worried about the growth of unemployment and the 
loss of social benefits. Fears about growing unemployment are highest in Germany, 
Greece and France, while worries about decreasing social benefits are most widespread 
in Germany, France and Austria (EB57: Spring 2002). 
While those thinking negatively about migration and by implication about enlargement 
base their evaluation on down-to-earth economic considerations, citing perceived 
impacts of immediate relevance to the life of the individual, the minority thinking 
positively about migration are much more likely to argue for their position on the basis 
of moral and cultural considerations: 43% mention the need to offer equal opportunities 
for all and 37% the culturally enriching experience of the presence of immigrant 
communities. 40% of them recognises, however, the favourable economic impact that 
the migrant workers may have on the economy of the receiving country (Special 
EB56.3: January-February 2002). 
Given the strongly negative attitude to migration, the views concerning possible 
restrictions on allowing people from CEECs to work in the EU are not surprising. The 
absolute majority of EU-societies favour restrictions, and the number of people who 
prefer not allowing Eastern Europeans to enter EU labour markets at all is twice as high 
as the number of those who would allow them to work without restrictions. The link 
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between the stance on the question concerning migrant workers and the overall 
evaluation of enlargement is clear: Societies that are less supportive of allowing Eastern 
Europeans to work in the EU are often those that are also less likely to favour 
enlargement (e.g. Germany, Austria, France or the UK), whereas several societies with 
above average tolerance towards Eastern European workers also most positive about 
enlargement (e.g. Spain, Portugal, Sweden or Italy, see country by country data on 

































































Accept without restrictions Accept with restrictions Not accept
ACCEPTANCE OF PEOPLE FROM EASTERN EUROPE WISHING TO WORK IN THE EU
Source: EB48:1997
 
The question of unemployment, one of the most important concerns of EU-societies, 
seems to be strongly linked to enlargement through another fear. Besides the prospect 
of growing competition for jobs with CEE migrants in their own country, a large 
majority of EU-citizens also worry about the transfer of jobs to countries with lower 
production costs. Since 1997 the number of those fearing such transfer of jobs grew 
from 51% to around 59-61% (EB47-55: 1997-2001). Understandably especially the 
societies of more developed member-states with relatively higher wage levels 
(Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Netherlands) worry about the 
competition from alternative cheaper production locations. 
The importance of attached to unemployment and the connected lack of support for 
enlargement is well illustrated by answers to survey questions concerning potential 
priority areas for EU-action. Out of twelve issues on the EU-agenda (ranging from the 
maintenance of peace, the fight against organised crime, through the protection of 
human and consumer rights to the introduction of the Euro, or institutional reform) 
respondents have consistently ranked enlargement as by far the least important. On the 
other hand, the overwhelming majority of EU citizens are of the opinion that fighting 
unemployment should be the most important priority for the EU.  









































Protecting human rights, democracy
Getting closer to European citizens
Successfully implementing the euro
Asserting EU's political importance
Reforming the institutions of the EU
Enlargement
Source: EB48-58:1997-2002
PREFERENCES CONCERNING EU PRIORITIES
 
Societies attaching utmost importance to unemployment are often among those least 
likely to consider enlargement to be a priority  (e.g. France: unemployment: 95%, 
enlargement: 20%), while those attaching relatively low importance to unemployment 
are the ones most likely to be of the view that enlargement should be treated as priority 
(e.g. Denmark: unemployment: 81%, enlargement: 72%, EB58: Autumn 2002). As 
apparent from the above analysis the first ranking of the fight against unemployment 
and the last ranking of enlargement are related. 
Among the possible EU-priorities listed, besides enlargement, people consider least 
important the reform of EU institutions and asserting the political and diplomatic 
importance of the EU around the world (46-55%, EB48-58: 1997-2002). Until the year 
2000 introducing the euro was also among the issues least likely to be considered as a 
priority by the EU-public. From these data we can conclude that besides the more 
macro-level actions people are in general also less likely to consider as priority issues 
that involve considerable changes from the status quo. 
2.2.3. Agricultural costs  
Worries about potential losses for the agricultural sector are also widespread. When 
asked to speculate about the impact of enlargement on various sectors, EU-societies 
tend to project more positive than negative changes for sectors such as tourism, trade, 
finance, industry and transport. In the agricultural sector, however, the circle of those 
expecting negative changes as a result of enlargement is more than twice as large 
(35%), as the number of those projecting benefits (17%). 33% expects no significant 
change in European agriculture as a result of the accession of new countries (Special 
EB56.3: January-February 2002). 
The absolute majority of EU-societies expect more difficulties for farmers, the 
disappearance of small and medium-size farms and the growth of unfair competition in 
agricultural products. Almost half of the population also worries about the increase in 
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imports and the resulting decline in food security. Most agricultural fears are especially 
















Source: EB54-Special eb55.0: 2000-2001
PERCEPTION OF AGRICULTURAL COSTS OF ENLARGEMENT (% of people agreeing)
 
3. NET COST-BENEFIT BALANCE 
The fact that enlargement consistently ranks lowest on the public‟s „priority list‟ for the 
EU shows the lack of support. The unusually high number of people with no opinion on 
most enlargement related questions is indicative of both the volatility of attitudes 
concerning enlargement and the general lack of knowledge on candidate countries, but 
the opposition to enlargement – motivated by fears of growing migration and 
unemployment – seems deeply rooted. 
When asked whether they are in general in favour or against the idea that the EU should 
enlarge to include new countries, 52% of the population supports the idea and 30% 
expresses opposition (EB58, Autumn 2002). This is a strong improvement since early 
2001, when support remained at a low 43% and opposition was 35%. The more 
favourable recent trends in attitudes may represent temporary shifts (e.g. due to 
increased importance attached to the maintenance of peace in the aftermath of 
September 11) or may be the result of growing level of information, slightly growing 
awareness of the important benefits and the limited costs of enlargement. 
Support of the general idea of enlargement, however, cannot be directly translated into 
full support to the accession of CEECs. Only 20% of EU-societies would like to see all 
candidates join the EU, while almost the same number of people (19%) would deny 
membership to any new country, and the relative majority (46%) would only grant 
membership to some of the applicants. EU-societies would be most happy to see the 
accession of rich (currently non-applicant) countries such as Switzerland and Norway 
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(75-75%), whose accession would not be overshadowed by fears of migration and 
increasing budgetary costs. Among all ten CEE candidates there is only one country, 
Hungary whose accession is be supported by the majority of the EU-public (52%). We 
find further six CEE candidates (Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, 
Lithuania) whose accession somewhat more people support than oppose (with 40-48% 
in favour of them joining the EU and 33-37% against). The accession of the remaining 
CEE-candidates (and Turkey) generates higher opposition than support among the EU-
public (EB58: Autumn 2002). 
As the analysis of questions concerning migration, unemployment and transfer of jobs 
have demonstrated, if a choice has to be made by EU-citizens on enlargement it is 
likely to be most influenced by expectations concerning the influence of enlargement 
on their personal economic prospects. More than two thirds of the EU-public expects no 
change in his/her own life as a result of enlargement, but the percentage of those 
expecting disadvantages is slightly higher (13%) than of those hoping for improvements 
(10%), tilting the personal cost-benefit balance to the negative. In Germany, Austria, 
UK, Luxemburg, Finland and Denmark the number of people expecting the 
deterioration of their personal life is more than double of those expecting improvement. 
The two most important reasons mentioned by those fearing negative change are more 
immigrants looking for work in their country (55%) and increasing unemployment 


















































































better the same as today does not know worse
Source: Special EB55.0:2001
NET BALANCE OF IMPACT IN PERSONAL LIFE
'Do you think that after enlargement your personal life will be …?'
 
Considering all of the four different measures of support (enlargement as a priority, 
favour or oppose the inclusion of new countries, expectation of impact on personal life 
and average of the support for the accession of each of the candidate countries) 
countries with societies that are most favourable to enlargement include the four 
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cohesion countries (Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece), Italy and Sweden. People in 
Germany, Austria and France on the other hand consistently showed low public support 
for enlargement. (The question of variation of public support to enlargement in member 
states will be taken up by Section III.1 below.) 
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III. COSTS AND BENEFITS AND THEIR PERCEPTION: 
WHY SO DIFFERENT? 
This part of the paper aims to demonstrate and explain the discrepancy between the real 
and the perceived cost- benefit balance of enlargement. In Section 1 the contrast 
between real and perceived costs and benefits will be examined in two ways: First, by 
comparing the variation of public support to enlargement with the distribution of 
(political and economic) gains projected to be realised in incumbent member-states. 
Second, by building an aggregate „qualitative balance sheet‟ of enlargement comparing 
and contrasting real and perceived costs and benefits, summarising the conclusions 
from Sections I and II. In Section 2, I will offer four possible explanations of the 
contrast. 
 
1. CONTRASTING REAL AND PERCEIVED COSTS AND BENEFITS 
1.1. VARIATION BY MEMBER-STATES 
The discrepancy between the variation of public support to enlargement in the current 
member states and the distribution of economic as well as geopolitical benefits to be 
expected from enlargement is striking. Economic gains from enlargement are projected 
to be greatest relative to the size of their economy in Germany and Austria, and in 
absolute terms in Germany, France and the UK (Baldwin et al.: 1997). Gains from 
increased political stability will be primarily enjoyed by countries in close proximity to 
CEECs: Germany, Austria, Sweden, Finland and Italy (Sedelmeier: 2001). Cohesion 
countries are less likely to gain much from enlargement in economic terms, and – with 
the exception of Greece – they will also be influenced to a lesser extent by the security 
benefits.  
Distribution of economic gains of enlargement among EU15
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On the basis of such distribution of economic and geopolitical benefits it may seem 
reasonable to expect that public support to enlargement is highest in countries that stand 
to gain most both economically and politically from enlargement. As we saw in Section 
II, however, survey data concerning support to enlargement reveals the contrary. Public 
support to enlargement is the lowest in the countries such as Germany, Austria, France 
and the UK that are expected to profit most from enlargement in economic and/or 
political terms, and it is among the highest in cohesion countries (Greece, Ireland, Spain 
and Portugal) that are unlikely to benefit considerably from enlargement. 
Ranking presented by the order of net support (% of those supporting - % of those opposing) Source: Eurobarometer 58, Autumn 2002
Public support and opposition to EU enlargement
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Why is public support lowest in countries expected to gain most from enlargement? 
Why is it highest in others, which are not expected to gain or lose substantially from it? 
Section 2 will aim to answer these and other questions about the apparent discrepancy 
between the cost and benefits of enlargement and the public perception of these costs 
and benefits. 
1.2. QUALITATIVE BALANCE SHEET OF ENLARGEMENT 
The table below summarises and contrasts the findings of Section I and II in the form of 
a qualitative balance sheet. The discrepancy between the real and the perceived cost-
benefit balance is substantial. The real cost-benefit balance is dominated by the security 
benefits closely connected to the irreversibility of CEE democratic and market reforms, 
but previously realised and future gains from trade liberalisation and the expansion of 
the Single Market leading to increased EU growth and competitiveness also figure 
prominently. While political risks (of the failure of institutional and decision-making 
reforms, of the worsening of relations with those left out or of the dilution of 
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integration) are undeniably increased by eastern enlargement, if these dangers are taken 
seriously and addressed appropriately than enlargement, by increasing the urgency of 
reforms, may even induce important policy benefits in these areas. Budgetary costs, in 
view of the Copenhagen deal, have been demonstrated to be minuscule and the most 
important non-budgetary concerns (of mass migration and growth of unemployment) 
are based on unfounded fears concerning politically highly sensitive issues with little 
economic rationale. 
In the perceived cost-benefit balance fears of unemployment due to immigration and 
transfer of jobs and concerns about budgetary burdens and agricultural losses associated 
with enlargement overshadow the recognised, but not highly valued benefits of growing 
political importance of the EU, increased peace and security and economic growth. 
Political fears (of increased bureaucracy and complexity of decision making and 
growing power of big member states) are also present, but are less likely to influence 
the overall stance on enlargement than the beliefs about perceived negative changes in 
social and living standards. 
As discussed in Sections I-II, the net balance of real costs and benefits is clearly 
positive, while the net balance of perceived costs and benefits is tilting towards the 
negative. The rest of the section will aim to provide alternative explanations for these 
discrepancies. 
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THE REAL AND PERCEIVED QUALITATIVE BALANCE SHEET OF ENLARGEMENT 
 
BENEFITS  COSTS 
Political benefits  Political costs 
Real Perceived  Real Perceived 
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BALANCE OF REAL COSTS AND BENEFITS: CLEARLY POSITIVE 
 
BALANCE OF PERCEIVED COSTS AND BENEFITS: 
UNCERTAIN, TILTING TOWARDS THE NEGATIVE 
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2. EXPLAINING THE CONTRAST 
2.1. GLOBAL PRESSURES 
Some pressures (e.g. the need to reform the Common Agricultural Policy) arising from 
globalisation are further exacerbated by eastern enlargement. Several fears of the EU-
public are, however, rooted in global challenges independent of enlargement. Although 
a real danger, increased competition for EU-labour and agricultural and other producers 
is not a Central European but a global challenge, which cannot be decreased by 
delaying or vetoing enlargement (Grabbe: 2001). Unemployment (with the possible 
exception of some sectors where CEECs have comparative advantage) has nothing to 
do with enlargement. The EU trade surplus has even contributed to the creation of 
employment within the EU (Inotai: 1999), and enlargement is projected to create further 
jobs (Grabbe, 2001). Measures such as the transition period on labour movements are 
unlikely to provide solutions to the unemployment problems of the EU. The current 
economic downturn, the fiscal stringency required by EMU and the ageing of the EU-
population contribute to the financing problems of EU welfare systems (Inotai: 1997, 
Mayhew: 1998). These problems result in fear of change, uncertainty about the future 
and increased nationalism in EU-societies (Mayhew: 1998), which, in turn, increase 
opposition to enlargement.  
2.2. GENERAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS INTEGRATION 
Enlargement – except from some specific aspects eliciting intense emotion – is an issue 
of relatively low salience for the EU-public. The fact that an overwhelming majority of 
EU-societies expect no change in their own life as a result of enlargement (68%, 
Special EB55.0: Spring 2001), and even higher numbers admit not being informed 
(77%, EB58: Autumn 2002) about enlargement proves the point. As a result 
enlargement is considered a part of the general integration process, a macro-level, 
foreign policy issue. Thus attitudes to enlargement are at least partly influenced by 
general attitudes towards integration. In general (with some notable exceptions) 
societies expecting benefits from their countries‟ membership are more supportive of 
enlargement (e.g. Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy, etc.) too, while more Eurosceptic 
societies (mainly the UK, Austria and France) are less likely to favour enlargement as 
well. 
On the whole 69% of people supporting their own countries EU-membership are in 
favour of enlargement, while only 24% of those considering their country‟s 
membership as a „bad thing‟ think favourable of enlargement (EB58: Autumn 2002). 












 Source: EB58: Autumn 2002
Average support to membership
Average support to enlargement
SUPPORT TO ENLARGEMENT AND INTEGRATION IN CURRENT MEMBER-STATES
 
The long-term decline (experienced since the early 1990s) of public support for 
integration is a sign of the growing democratic deficit of the EU, widely discussed by 
academic literature elsewhere. Although given the higher level of information, 
knowledge and interest in EU-integration in general, perceptions on integration have a 
stronger impact on perceptions on enlargement than vice versa; the influence appears to 
be a two-way relationship. Support for integration was at an all-time high in 1991 
(72%), which was partly connected to the collapse of Communism in CEECs and the 
initial enthusiasm concerning the prospects for reunifying Europe. Support for both 
integration and enlargement has declined significantly since then. After a temporary 
rise around the start of accession negotiations in 1998 with the first countries (and the 
NATO-accession of the first three CEECs), support for both integration and 
enlargement experienced a further decline as the budgetary and financial implications 
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After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, support to integration increased again 
considerably, and once more in parallel with support to enlargement. In times of crisis, 
belonging to a community of European countries gains importance in the eyes of the 
public. The function of enlargement as a security guarantee in Europe may explain the 
link between rising support to integration and to enlargement in the aftermath of 
September 11. The existence of this link seems to be supported by the finding (see chart 
on “Preferences concerning EU-priorities in Section II.2.2.2.) that importance attributed 
to maintaining peace and security in Europe (usually rated second most important after 
the task of fighting unemployment) took priority in the autumn of 2001. Since the 
autumn of 2001, again we see a slight drop in support to EU-membership, as well as 
support to enlargement. 
2.3. NATURE OF BENEFITS AND COSTS 
The nature of costs and benefits associated with enlargement has a strong influence on 
public perceptions as some types of impacts tend to be more emphasised, while others 
are more likely to be neglected. The three dimensions of the costs and benefits of 
enlargement that seem to influence most their perception are the timing, distribution 
and tangibility of these impacts. In addition to the importance of the nature of real costs 
and benefits in determining their public perception, it should also be recognised that 
some of the most characteristic public expectations associated with enlargement (e.g. 
the fears of mass migration) are based on unfounded fears, unrelated to the real cost-
benefit balance. 
2.3.1. Short-term costs versus long-term benefits 
The timeframe of costs and benefits is crucial in two respects: Firstly, the importance of 
significant long-term benefits of enlargement (e.g. increased peace, increased economic 
growth and competitiveness) that can be secured as a result of short-term costs (e.g. 
pre-accession aid, or transfers to CEECs from the Structural Funds) tend to be 
underestimated or ignored. This is so partly because the public may simply fail to make 
the link between the long-run impacts and enlargement, partly because long-term 
impacts necessarily involve higher uncertainty, thus risk-averse societies will often 
attach greater weight to short-term implications. This tendency is further reinforced by 
the unwillingness of politicians with short time horizons to publicly commit to short-
term sacrifices leading to long-term benefits. The „political discount rate‟ (Bronk, July 
2002) attached to long-term benefits tends to be much higher than the discount rate 
applied by economists. If politicians perceive that the public does not see the link 
between enlargement and its long-term benefits, or fears the uncertainty associated with 
them, they are less likely to make a firm commitment. As Anderson and Kaltenhalter 
argued “no elite decision-maker is going to push integration if it means a domestic 
backlash that could push them from office” (1996: 178). This lack of commitment, in 
turn, influences public opinion. The result is a vicious circle producing a distorted and 
negative evaluation of the cost-benefit balance focusing on short-term budgetary 
expenditures and neglecting more long-term benefits. 
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Secondly, some important and arguably reversible benefits that had already been 
realised due to the prospect of accession (e.g. liberalised trade, decreased risk premium, 
increased predictability of CEE markets), similarly to the benefits only to be realised in 
the long-run, are often not linked to enlargement, and therefore are not taken into 
account in the public‟s cost-benefit balance. Thus, the short-term budgetary costs of 
enlargement receive far more public attention than some of the much more important 
benefits which have already been secured or which will only be realised in the long run. 
It is not enough to ensure that the EU-societies are aware of certain benefits; the link 
between these gains and enlargement also must be recognized (Bosch-Newton: 1995).  
2.3.2. Dispersed benefits versus concentrated costs  
2.3.2.1. Distribution of impacts across countries 
As projected by economic models, the net economic benefits of enlargement relative to 
the size of their economies will be greatest in Germany and Austria, but France and the 
UK will also incur substantial gains in absolute terms. Cohesion countries are unlikely 
to gain much in economic terms, even a slight economic loss was projected for Portugal  
(Baldwin: 1997). Why is it then that societies in Germany, Austria and France are 
among the most sceptical of enlargement, whereas people in cohesion countries are 
among the most supportive? (See charts in Section 1.1) The relatively low Austrian, 
German and French support for integration in general only partly explains the lack of 
support for enlargement of these societies (see Section 2.2). Due to their closer 
proximity, Austrian and German publics are the ones most strongly characterized by the 
fears of increased migration, crime, competition and loss of jobs due to relocation of 
industries. France is mainly concerned by the impact of the pending CAP-reform on its 
farmers. All three countries (especially Germany) are worried about and resist to 
increasing their contribution to the budget to finance enlargement.  
People in more distant cohesion countries (Greece is a partial exception) are less fearful 
of negative changes in their own life. At the same time Spanish, Portuguese, Irish and 
Greek societies – due to their own experience – are most aware of the role of EU-
accession as an anchor of democracy (Niedermayer: 1995). Unfortunately even public 
support for enlargement in the cohesion countries has started to erode as budgetary 
implications of enlargement have moved more and more to the centre of discussions. 
The vocal resistance of the governments of cohesion countries to giving up some of 
their transfers in the future is likely to have exerted a negative influence on their 
societies‟ attitudes to enlargement as well.  
In some small countries with strongly pro-integrationist societies (e.g. Belgium, 
Luxemburg) that are not likely to be significantly influenced by enlargement the 
worries that enlargement may prevent further deepening of integration have a negative 
impact on public perceptions. Especially before the Nice summit, these and other small 
countries were also concerned by losing influence as a result of institutional reforms 
necessitated by enlargement. Thus, we see, despite the demonstrated aggregate net 
benefits of enlargement, practically all societies feel concerned by one or more of the 
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real or perceived problems of enlargement. All in all, public support is lowest in 
countries where we find sectors or social groups which perceive to realise concentred 
losses as a result of enlargement, even if these countries on the whole may expect to 
realise most aggregate net benefits of enlargement. 
2.3.2.2. Distribution of impacts across groups 
In order to understand the discrepancy between the real and perceived cost-benefit 
balance of enlargement it is crucial to make the distinction between aggregate costs and 
benefits and particularistic costs and benefits realised by particular groups. Often the 
latter receive more attention and influence to a larger extent the political dynamics, and 
therefore the very conditions of enlargement. As a result, the importance of widely 
dispersed benefits resulting from accession are underestimated, even if in aggregate 
terms they are much larger than the concentrated costs that might have to be faced by 
certain much narrower social or economic groups. 
The influence of organised interests on politicians is one of the most important forces 
affecting the conditions of enlargement. Through their influence on public opinion, 
interest groups further enhance their influence on enlargement policy. Enlargement 
brings widely dispersed benefits to important sections of society. Consumers on the 
whole gain significantly from wider choice and lower prices resulting from greater 
competition and growing scale economies associated with the expanding Single Market. 
Consumers constitute so-called „latent‟ groups. These groups with potentially large 
aggregate, but small individual gains cannot act collectively. Active support from these 
beneficiaries is prevented by the relatively high costs of political action in comparison 
with the small individual gains, the lack of selective incentives and the large numbers 
and heterogeneity of the people making up the group  (Olson: 1965). Also, the fact that 
many of the benefits of enlargement are considered to be the result of natural 
developments and are not linked to enlargement directly further decreases the chances 
of active popular support.  
The perceived costs, however, are concentrated and linked to enlargement. The groups 
that feel directly threatened by enlargement are relatively small, homogeneous and 
perceive to realise large individual losses with enlargement. They therefore have more 
incentive to act than the beneficiaries. The collective action problem that this 
combination of perceived costs and benefits leads to is well described by Weimer and 
Vining (1992: 121):  
If we believe that most people are economically rational, then the greater the expected net benefits one 
expects to reap from some political activity, the more likely that one will undertake the activity. Policies 
that would spread large aggregate benefits widely and uniformly among the electorate may not elicit 
active political support, because, for any individual, the costs of political activity exceed the benefits 
(…). Similarly no individuals may find it in their own self-interests to protest policies that spread costs 
widely. In contrast, at least some people will likely find it in their self-interest to become politically 
active when policies involve concentrated costs or benefits. Assuming that representatives respond at 
least somewhat to political activity, the consequence of individual rationality will be collective choices 
biased towards policies with concentrated benefits and away from policies with concentrated costs. This 
bias opens the door for the adoption of policies for which total costs exceed total benefits. 
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As the quote concludes inaction on the part of large beneficiary groups and successful 
action on the part of organised interests are likely to lead to losses in aggregate net 
benefits. Interest group action is aimed at the reallocation of existing resources without 
producing new resources (Levine-Caporaso: 1992).  Turning resources away from more 
productive uses reduces economic growth (Olson: 1982).  
There are several reasons to expect that interest group action aiming at delaying or 
modifying the conditions of enlargement has been successful in influencing both public 
opinion and decision-makers. The majority of the society is „rationally ignorant‟ 
(Olson: 1982) concerning the implications of enlargement. Lack of knowledge is 
„rational‟ given the relatively high costs of obtaining information and low chances of 
influencing the enlargement process. The accession of CEECs will be ratified by 
parliaments without (in most cases) putting the question to publics in referenda. Since 
large beneficiary groups are unaware of the benefits, or do not link them to 
enlargement, elected politicians have less incentive to act in their interest and more 
incentive to increase the chances of their re-election by favouring politically more 
active and affluent interest groups.  
Since individuals gather the little information they have on enlargement from readily 
available „cheap‟ sources (including interest groups, politicians and media – see Section 
2.4), interest groups influence politicians not only directly through lobbying, but also 
indirectly, through influencing public opinion (Gabel: 1998). Thus, we can conclude 
that the declining public support for enlargement over time and the growing fears 
concerning migration and agriculture are clearly connected to the increasing activity of 
interest groups.  
The two interest groups having most influence on the public concerning enlargement 
are farmers and organised labour. Farmers have long been the social group most 
directly benefiting from EU-membership. While the benefits of CAP have been 
primarily concentrated to big farmers, its costs have not only been widely distributed 
(among consumers and taxpayers), but were also concealed (the link between high food 
prices/taxes and subsidies to farmers is not clear for most citizens), preventing 
opposition to bearing the costs. Variation in farmers‟ support for integration is closely 
related to the changes in CAP: Farmers, who were best-off under the original price-
support mechanism of CAP had been significantly more supportive of their countries‟ 
membership until the early 1980s. From 1986 (when significant CAP reform was 
planned in connection with the Single Market Programme) farmers became increasingly 
less supportive. The trend continued during the period of shifting from price to income 
support (Bosch-Newton: 1995). The prospect of transfers to CEECs as well as of future 
CAP reform (often considered to be a precondition or a necessary consequence of 
eastern enlargement) has prompted active interest group action aiming to protect the 
status quo. COPA-COGECA, the biggest farmer organisation in the EU already warned 
that “farmers in the EU must not be expected to shoulder the costs of enlargement” 
(www.euractiv.com, 20 February 2002). The staunch resistance of the French 
government to table the debate on the reform of the CAP before 2006 illustrates the 
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domestic influence of the farmer lobby. The final outcome of accession negotiations in 
agriculture (offering CEE farmers only one fourth of the transfers going to incumbent 
member-states in the first year and imposing a transition period of ten years before 
transfers reach the level offered to farmers from existing member states) also 
demonstrate the success of the farmer lobby in opposing both CAP reform and giving 
up their transfers in favour of the farmers of less developed and more agricultural 
CEECs. 
The other effective interest group concerning enlargement is organised labour. The 
widespread fears of migration and loss of jobs among the public at large provided 
valuable arguments for organised labour successfully lobbying for imposing a 
transitional period on labour movement from CEECs after their accession. Public fears 
of unemployment and migration have been widespread in Western Europe, and the 
prospect of eastern enlargement seems to increase such worries. Both populist 
politicians and trade unions can easily rely on and manipulate these fears in order to 
support their anti-enlargement stances. Messages concerning the threat of massive job 
losses – given the uncertainty of the identity of losers – are much more effective than 
more realistic arguments about wider product choice, lower prices or employment 
created through long-run structural change.  
Other interest groups that oppose enlargement include industries in low value-added 
sectors, such as textile or chemicals, and other import competing businesses fearing 
increased competition from CEE producers (Mayhew: 1998). They are, however, much 
less likely to exert a strong influence given their divided interests (some of them expect 
benefits from relocation etc.) and the resulting organisational weaknesses. 
Some of the most important and influential pro-enlargement interest groups (business 
lobbies, MNCs, employers‟ associations) also seem to exercise an ambiguous impact on 
the enlargement policy. On the one hand, they expect to realise large concentrated 
economic gains from enlargement, therefore they are likely to be strong supporters of 
speedy accession of CEECs. On the other hand, these forces are primarily motivated by 
the maximisation of tangible particularistic business gains, therefore their influence on 
public perceptions and on the terms of enlargement is not necessarily purely beneficial 
for CEECs. For example their strong focus on the (for them largely beneficial) 
economic impacts of enlargement may be partly responsible for the spread of material 
cost-benefit mentality in the public debate on enlargement, which further contributes to 
the growing neglect of important intangible political and security benefits. 
2.3.3. Intangible benefits versus tangible costs 
The tangibility of impacts also influences their perception. Tangible and quantifiable 
costs and benefits usually receive far more attention than intangible implications. Many 
of the political gains of enlargement are intangible and based on negative arguments, 
which are usually less convincing than positive arguments. The important security 
benefits of enlargement and high costs of non-enlargement only become visible if 
enlargement does not take place (Bertelsman: 1998). Most economic benefits are macro 
  36 
level gains (e.g. economic growth, increased trade etc.), which – even when 
quantifiable and recognised by the public – are not likely to generate widespread 
support among societies more concerned with short-term life prospects.  
The perceived costs are typically readily identifiable, quantifiable and of immediate 
relevance to the life of the individual (potential mass migration from CEECs leading to 
unemployment or decreasing wages in Western Europe, budgetary transfers to new 
countries). Even though most of these costs are not real or would affect only very small 
segments of EU-societies, they substantially contribute to opposition to enlargement 
given the uncertainty of predominantly risk-averse societies about the identity of losers.  
The influence of budgetary considerations on the overall position on enlargement is 
well illustrated by comparing attitudes to the 1995 enlargement (when net-payer 
countries joined the EU) with the evaluation of eastern enlargement. In the year when 
Austria, Sweden and Finland joined the EU 64% of EU-societies expected benefits 
from enlargement for the EU, and five times more people (29%) projected positive than 
negative change in their own life (6%, EB43: 1995), whereas now – despite the much 
larger growth of the Single Market and the greater long-term impact on stability in 
Europe – only 40% expect the EU to realise benefits and the number of people fearing 
personal losses (13%) is higher than those hoping for gains as a result of enlargement 
(10%, EB55: 2001).  
2.3.4. Perceived versus real costs 
Some of the most important fears concerning enlargement are unfounded. As discussed 
in Section I, the expectations of the growth of migration from CEECs are greatly 
exaggerated and the limited migration that enlargement is likely to lead to is beneficial 
for EU-societies. As Inglehart argued, however, the influence of public concerns on 
elite action depends on the intensity of the belief, on the degree to which deep-seated 
emotions are attached to it (1977). EU-societies consider the fight against 
unemployment to be the main priority, thus it is not surprising that the fear of increased 
inflow of migrant workers dominates attitudes to enlargement and led to a lengthy 
transition period on the free movement of labour after accession.  
Other (real) costs that are frequently associated with enlargement would also arise 
without enlargement. The reform of the CAP, the Structural Funds, and the institutional 
system of the EU (as argued in Section I) would be necessary even without 
enlargement, even though enlargement increases the urgency of reforms. 
2.4. PUBLIC DEBATE 
Besides interest groups, it is politicians and – above all – the media that shape public 
debate and therefore public opinion on enlargement. The dual cause-and-effect 
relationship between the lack of commitment of elected politicians (fearing loss of 
support as a result of upholding an unpopular cause) and lack of support of the general 
public (whose primary information sources on enlargement include politicians) has 
been pointed out in Section 2.3.1. The strong correlation between elite and mass views 
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on integration (Wessels: 1995) appears to be true for opinions concerning enlargement 
as well. Besides politicians in power, those in opposition can also influence public 
opinion. Szczerbiak and Taggart (2000) found that parties in opposition aiming to 
collect protest votes are often strongly anti-European. Once in government these parties 
shift from hard to soft Euroscepticism. The case of the Austrian Freedom Party 
illustrates that vocal anti-enlargement position goes along with hard-line 
Euroscepticism while populist parties are in opposition, and shift to a softer version of 
criticism once in government. The high opposition registered among Austrians also 
shows that if enlargement related issues become part of party competition, public 
opinion on enlargement is likely to become more divided.  
EU-leaders‟ discourse on enlargement has undergone a considerable change since the 
beginning of the 1990s, which has undoubtedly also influenced the public debate and 
public perceptions.  In the early 1990s EU discourse was heavily infused with 
references to liberal norms and values, and centred on the core concept of EU‟s 
responsibility, moral commitment and historic duty towards CEECs (Sedelmeier, 
2001). The presidency conclusions of the Strasbourg summit claimed that “all must, 
more than ever, demonstrate their sense of responsibility. (…) The Community and its 
Member States are fully conscious of the common responsibility which devolves on 
them in this decisive phase in the history of Europe” (European Council, December 
1989). Leon Brittan, the commissioner for external economic affairs argued that the 
“courage of our Eastern neighbours must be matched by the generosity and imagination 
of our own response to the new world they are opening up. It is an awesome but 
exciting responsibility for us all” (Brittan, 19 January 1990). Among future benefits 
arising for the EU from building closer ties with CEECs primarily political 
considerations of stability and security were emphasised, but possible economic 
benefits were also mentioned. Strengthening cooperation with CEECs was described as 
“a historical opportunity to turn fragmentation and the threat of armed conflict into a 
broad process of European integration” (Andriessen, 9 April 1990). The Commission 
argued that early association “conforms with the Community's own interests” as it “will 
contribute to political stability, encourage the development of new instruments for 
cooperation and strengthen confidence on the part of economic operators” (European 
Commission, 1 February 1990). 
In complete contrast to the high political rhetoric of the early years of the enlargement 
process, the enlargement discourse during the last phase of accession negotiations 
strongly reflected a short-term material cost-benefit mentality. References to liberal 
values of democracy, pluralism, rule of law, as well as to the concept of responsibility 
that the early discourse was so heavily infused with, were rarely made in the more 
recent debate, in which concepts of „constraints,‟ „compromise‟ and „balance‟ took the 
central place. As a result, enlargement often appears as a zero-sum game. Even pro-
enlargement discourse is infused with a strong materialist cost-benefit mentality: The 
Commission proposal for financing enlargement, largely realised by the Copenhagen 
summit, was described as a “great value for money for a unified Europe” (Schreyer, 
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quoted in Commission, 30 January 2002). The president of the Commission aimed to 
rally support for enlargement by arguing that it is “a positive-sum game where we all 
win, (…) we should regard expenditure on enlargement as an investment rather than as 
a cost” (Prodi, 28 January 2002). Given the predominance of materialist considerations 
even among the main promoters of enlargement, the overwhelming presence of 
budgetary and economic fears in public perceptions may not be so surprising. 
Interestingly, EU-leaders‟ enlargement discourse seems to have shifted once more after 
the completion of accession negotiations in December 2002. The speeches made by 
Commission president Romano Prodi and enlargement commissioner Günter 
Verheugen in recent weeks demonstrate clear signs of this shift. References to the “end 
to the division of Europe” (Prodi, 14 December 2002), the importance of “shared values 
[of] democracy, the rule of the law, freedom, respect for minority rights, solidarity,” to 
“lasting stability throughout the continent” being the most important benefit of 
enlargement (Prodi, 27 February, 2003) – which were so familiar in the early discourse 
but were completely missing from the discourse accompanying the accession 
negotiations – are back in place. “European divisions and uncertainty will be replaced 
by stability and security. (…) What we can be assured of is that with this enlargement 
we have taken a giant step for ward in bridging the artificial divide from 1945. We are 
on track for creating a Europe that is free, democratic and dynamic. A Europe in peace 
and not least a Europe that is whole” (Verheugen, 4 March 2003).  The question 
remains, however, whether this welcome return to emphasising nonmaterial benefits of 
enlargement has not come too late to have a real impact in the public debate on 
enlargement and to positively influence the cautious perceptions of national politicians 
and publics in the run-up to the accession of ten new member-states. 
Besides European and national politicians, media coverage of enlargement also 
influences public perceptions. Media analyses found that until around 1997 media 
coverage of enlargement tended to be fragmented and superficial. Reporting on 
integration was preoccupied with issues such as EMU or institutional reform. From the 
publication of Agenda2000, and even more so from the opening of negotiations, media 
attention has increased, but the focus increasingly shifted from the initial declarative 
enthusiasm about extending peace and prosperity and democracy to the financial costs 
of enlargement (European Journalism Centre: 1999). Media, just like politicians, have 
tended to concentrate on the short-term cost-benefit balance, ignoring both long-term 
and already realised but reversible benefits and failing to differentiate between impacts 
of enlargement and the negative implications of globalisation (Inotai: 1999).  
The failure to generate a public debate engaging and informing EU-publics on 
enlargement is evident from the results of public opinion surveys: Only 2% of EU-
public feel very well, and 20% rather well informed about enlargement, while 50% 
feels rather uninformed and 27% completely uninformed. A mere 3% feel very much, 
and a further 18% somewhat involved in the public debate on enlargement, while 33% 
feels very little and 41% not at all involved (EB58: Autumn 2002).  
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CONCLUSION 
The aim of this paper has been threefold: First, to build up a broad real cost-benefit 
balance of eastern enlargement including not only quantifiable and short-term gains and 
losses, but also intangible long-term consequences, as well as impacts realised already 
during the pre-accession phase. Second, to determine the public perception of the cost-
benefit balance in the current member-states. Third, to point out and offer possible 
explanations for the discrepancies between expert projections and public perceptions of 
costs and benefits.  
The analysis found that although enlargement is a clear „positive-sum game,‟ bringing 
important security and economic benefits for the EU at the price of low budgetary costs, 
public perceptions are dominated by deeply rooted – and mostly unfounded – economic 
fears of growing migration, unemployment, difficulties for the agriculture and by 
widespread worries of increasing financial burdens and decreasing transfers for 
incumbent member-states.  
Four main types of explanation have been presented for this discrepancy between 
positive net gains and negative perceptions. First, some of the fears wrongly associated 
with enlargement are rooted in global challenges that are independent of enlargement. 
Second, EU-publics with little interest and knowledge on enlargement tend to form 
their opinion in line with their general feelings concerning European integration. Thus 
the sizeable Euroscepticism of Western societies has a negative influence on attitudes to 
enlargement, considered another step in integration. The third group of arguments relate 
to the nature of costs and benefits. This part of the analysis demonstrated why public 
opinion in particular and the political process in general “often gives more weight to 
impacts that are concentrated, tangible, certain and immediate than to impacts that are 
diffuse, intangible, uncertain and delayed” (Weimer-Vining: 1992: 224). Finally, the 
importance of the public debate (media, politicians and interest groups) in forming 
public opinion has been pointed out.  
The discrepancy between the real and perceived cost-benefit balance is significant, 
because it seems to exert an influence on the very conditions of enlargement. As a 
result, public perceptions of enlargement may also influence the political dynamics and 
the public legitimacy of an enlarged EU. This realisation underlines the responsibility 
of interest groups manipulating public fears, as well as the responsibility of politicians 
motivated by short-term considerations, and giving in to interest group pressures 
instead of committing to a form of enlargement that may increase the net benefits for 
the EU as well. 
  40 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Anderson, J. Christopher, Kaltenhalter, Karl C. (1996), „The Dynamics of Public Opinion 
toward European Integration, 1973-93‟, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 
2(2),  pp.175-199. 
Anderson, J. Christopher, Reichert, M. Shawn  (1996), „Economic Benefits and Support for 
Membership in the EU: A Cross-National Analysis‟, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 15, No. 3, 
pp. 231-249. 
Anderson, K. and Tyers, R. (1995), „Implications of EC expansion for European agricultural 
policies, trade and welfare,‟ CEPR Discussion Paper No. 829, London. 
Andriessen, Frans (9 April 1990), “Speech by Mr. Andriessen at the Occasion of the 10th 
Annual Paul- Henri Spaak Lecture - Harvard University,” http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/. 
Baldwin, Richard E. (1994), Towards and Integrated Europe, Centre for Economic Policy 
Research, London. 
Baldwin, Richard E. (1995), „The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union‟, European 
Economic Review, No. 39, pp. 474-481. 
Baldwin, Richard E., et al. (1997), „The Costs and Benefits of Eastern Enlargement: the Impact 
on the EU and Central Europe‟, Economic Policy, No. 24, pp. 125-176. 
Barysch, Katinka and Grabbe, Heather (December 2002), Who is ready for enlargement?, 
Working Paper, Centre for European Reform, London. 
Bertelsmann Foundation Research Group on European Affairs (1998), Costs, benefits and 
chances of eastern enlargement for the European Union, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 
Gutersloh. 
Boardman, Anthony E., Greenberg, Vining, Weimer (1996), Cost-benefit Analysis – Concepts 
and Practice, Chapters 1-2, Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ.  
Boeri, Tito, Brucker, Herbert (2000), The impact of Eastern Enlargement on Employment and 
Labour Markets in the EU Member-states, www.europa.eu.int/comm. 
Bofinger, Peter (1995), The political economy of the eastern enlargement of the EU, CEPR 
Discussion Paper No. 1234, London. 
Bosch, Augusti, Newton, Kenneth (1995), „Economic Calculus or Familiarity Breeds 
Content?‟, Niedermayer, Oskar and Sinnott, Richard (eds.), Public Opinion and International 
Governance, Oxford University Press, New York. 
Bronk, Richard (July 2002), Commitment and Credibility: EU Conditionality and Interim 
Gains, Working Paper, European Institute, London School of Economics, London. 
Brittan, Leon (19 January 1990), “Speech by Sir Leon Brittan to Sixth Formers of Leighton 
Park School,” Reading, http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/. 
Bruxinfo (16 December 2002), “A csúcstalálkozó eredményeinek áttekintése,” 
www.bruxinfo.hu. 
Bruxinfo (19 December 2002), “A költségvetési fejezet tárgyalásának eredményei,” 
www.bruxinfo.hu. 
Bruxinfo (23 December 2002), “Az EU bővítési főigazgatója Koppenhágáról és a 
közeljövőről,” www.bruxinfo.hu. 
  41 
Caporaso, James, Levine, David (1992), Theories of Political Economy, Chapter 6, Cambridge 
University Press, New York. 
Courchene, T., Goodhart, C., Majocchi, A., Moesen, W., Prud‟homme, T., Schneider, F., 
Smith, S., Spahn, B., Walsh, C. (1993), „Stable Money – Sound Finances,‟ European 
Economy, No. 53. 
Dalton, Russel J. and Eichenberg, Richard C. (1998), „Citizen Support for Policy Integration‟, 
in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (eds.), Supranational Governance: the 
Institutionalisation of the European Union, Oxford University Press, New York. 
Dresdner Bank (2001), Herausforderung EU-Erweiterung: Wachstumschancen nutzen – 
Reformen vorantreiben, Wirtschaftanalysen, Trends Spezial, Dresdner Bank AG, Frankfurt. 
Economist (2001), Europe’s magnetic attraction: A survey of European Union enlargement, 19 
March supplement. 
Eichenberg, Richard C., Dalton, Russel J (1993), „Europeans and the European Community: 
The Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration‟, International Organisation, 
Volume 47, issue 4, pp. 507-534. 
Eurobarometer No. 47 (1997), Public Opinion in the European Union, Commission of the 
European Communities, Brussels. 
Eurobarometer No. 48 (1997), Public Opinion in the European Union, Commission of the 
European Communities, Brussels. 
Eurobarometer No. 49 (1998), Public Opinion in the European Union, Commission of the 
European Communities, Brussels. 
Eurobarometer No. 50 (1998), Public Opinion in the European Union, Commission of the 
European Communities, Brussels. 
Eurobarometer No. 51 (1999), Public Opinion in the European Union, Commission of the 
European Communities, Brussels. 
Eurobarometer No. 52 (1999), Public Opinion in the European Union, Commission of the 
European Communities, Brussels. 
Eurobarometer No. 53 (2000), Public Opinion in the European Union, Commission of the 
European Communities, Brussels. 
Eurobarometer No. 54 (2000), Public Opinion in the European Union, Commission of the 
European Communities, Brussels. 
Eurobarometer No.55 (2001), Public Opinion in the European Union, Commission of the 
European Communities, Brussels. 
Eurobarometer No.56 (2001), Public Opinion in the European Union, Commission of the 
European Communities, Brussels. 
Eurobarometer No.57 (2002), Public Opinion in the European Union, Commission of the 
European Communities, Brussels. 
Eurobarometer No.58(2002), Public Opinion in the European Union, Commission of the 
European Communities, Brussels, March 2003 
Eurobarometer No 56.3 (2002), “Special Bureaux” – Getting Information on Europe, the 
Enlargement of the EU and Support for European Integration: European Public Opinion 
Takes the Floor – Executive Summary, Brussels. 
  42 
Eurobarometre No. 56.3 (2002) – Edition Speciale, Information sur l’Europe, l’Élargissement 
de l’Union Européenne et Adhésion au Projet Communautaire: La Parole aux Opinions des 
Quinzes. 
Eurobarometre, Special 55.0 (2001), L’Opinion Publique Européenne face á l’Élargissement 
de l’Union Européenne, á la Monnaie Unique et au Futur de l’Europe (Manuscript). 
Eurobarometer, No. 55.0 (2001) Special edition: Survey carried out for the European 
Commission’s Representations in the Member States – National Highlights, Brussels.   
Flash Eurobarometer 132/2 (2002), Enlargement of the European Union: Results and 
Comments, Brussels. 
European Commission (1996), First Report on Economic and Social Cohesion, Brussels. 
European Commission (1997), Agenda 2000, Brussels. 
European Commission (1998), Commission Communication to the Council and to the 
European Parliament on the Establishment of a New Financial Perspective for the Period 
2000-2006, Brussels, March 18. 
European Commission, Enlargement, www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement. 
European Commission (October 2000), “Statistics,” What is Phare?, 
www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement. 
European Commission (updated 30 December 2002), “Copenhagen agreed financial package,” 
Progress in the negotiations, www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement. 
European Commission (30 January 2002), “Common Financial Framework 2004-2006 for the 
Accession Negotiations, Communication from the Commission: Information Note,” 
SEC(2002) 102 final, Brussels, http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/. 
European Commission (1 February 1990), “Commission Gives Positive Response to Central 
and East European Countries Seeking G-24 Assistance and Eventual Association With 
Community,” Dn: P/90/4. 
European Commission (30 January 2002), “Common Financial Framework 2004-2006 for the 
Accession Negotiations, Communication from the Commission: Information Note,” 
SEC(2002) 102 final, Brussels, http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/. 
European Commission (updated 30 December 2002), “Copenhagen agreed financial 
framework for enlargement,” Progress in the negotiations, 
www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement. 
European Commission (11 February 2003), “Commission presents its proposal to adapt the 
financial framework for enlargement,” IP/03/217, www.europa.eu.int/rapid. 
European Council (December 1989), “Conclusions of the Presidency on the Strasbourg 
European Council of 8 and 9 December 1989,” http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/. 
Everts, Philip, Sinnott, Richard (1995), „Conclusion: European Publics and the Legitimacy f 
Internationalized Governance‟, Niedermayer, Oskar and Sinnott, Richard (eds.), Public 
Opinion and International Governance, New York, Oxford University Press. 
Faini, Riccardo, Portes, Richard (1995), European Union Trade with Eastern Europe: 
Adjustment and Opportunities, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London. 
Gabel, Matthew and Palmer, Harvey D. (1995), „Understanding variation in public support for 
European integration‟, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 27, pp. 3-19. 
  43 
Gabel, Matthew J. (1998), Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public opinion and 
European Union, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbour. 
Gács, J., Wyzan, M. (1999), The Time Pattern of Costs and Benefits of EU Accession, Interim 
Report, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, www.iiasa.ac.at.  
Grabbe Heather, Hughes, Kirsty (1998b), „Reform of the Structural Funds: Central and East 
European Perspectives‟, European Planning Studies, Vol. 6, No. 6. 
Grabbe, Heather (2001), Profiting from EU Enlargement, Centre for European Reform 
Publication, London. 
Grabbe, Heather (December 2002), The Copenhagen Deal for Enlargement, Briefing Note, 
Centre for European Reform, London. 
Grabbe, Heather, Hughes, Kirsty (1998), Enlarging the EU Eastwards, Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, London. 
Guggenbuhl, Adolf (1995),„The Political Economy of Association with Eastern Europe‟, 
Laursen, Finn (ed.),The Political Economy of European Integration, Kluwer Law International, 
the Hague, Boston. 
Haas, Ernst Bernard (1958), The Uniting of Europe, Stevens, London. 
Inglehart, Ronald (1977), „Long-Term Trends in Mass Support for European Unification‟, 
Government and Opposition, Vol. 12, pp.150-177. 
Inotai, András (1997), What is Novel about Eastern Enlargement of the European Union? – 
The Costs and Benefits of Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, Working Papers No. 
87, Institute for World Economics, Budapest. 
Inotai, András (1998), The Main Features and Current Trends in the European Union’s Trade 
Relations with Hungary and the Ten Associated Countries, 1989-1997, Institute for World 
Economics and National Committee for Technological Development, Budapest. 
Inotai, András (1999), Political, Economic and Social Arguments for and against EU 
Enlargement: A Survey of the Influence Pressure Groups, Working Papers No. 101, Institute 
for World Economics, Budapest. 
Inotai, András (2000), Reflections on the Timing of EU Enlargement, Working Papers No. 107, 
Institute for World Economics, Budapest. 
Kiss, Judit (1997), The Political Economy of Hungary’s Accession to the European Union, 
Working Papers No. 77, Institute for World Economics, Budapest. 
Mayhew, Alan (1998), Recreating Europe: The European Union’s Policy towards Central and 
Eastern Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Niedermayer, Oskar (1995), „Trends and Contrasts‟, Niedermayer, Oskar and Sinnott, Richard 
(eds.), Public Opinion and International Governance, Oxford University Press, New York. 
Niedermayer, Oskar and Sinnott, Richard (eds.),(1995), Public Opinion and International 
Governance, Oxford University Press, New York. 
Nye, Joseph (1971), Peace in Parts, Little, Brown, Boston. 
Olson, Mancur (1965), The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups, 
Harvard University Press, Oxford. 
Olson, Mancur (1982), The Rise and Decline of Nations: economic growth, stagflation, and 
social rigidities, Chapters 2-3, Yale University Press, New Haven, London. 
  44 
Prodi, Romano (28 January 2002), “Speech by Romano Prodi President of the European 
Commission 2002, a tremendous year for Europe,” Bocconi's University Milan, 28 January 
2002, http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/. 
Prodi, Romano (27 February 2003), “Hungary's campaign for accession kicks off Presentation 
of EU flags to Hungary's Mayors Budapest,” DN: SPEECH/03/101, 
 http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/. 
Prodi, Romano (14 December 2002), “Statement of President Prodi following the successful 
conclusion of enlargement negotiations,” DN: IP/02/1883,  http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/. 
Schmidt, Mogens, Scullion, Róisín (eds.), (1999), Reporting EU enlargement: the view from 
both sides, European Journalism Centre, Maastricht. 
Sedelmeier, Ulrich (2001),  “Accommodation Beyond Self-Interest: Identity, Policy Paradigms 
and the Limits of a Rationalist Approach to EU Policy towards Central Europe”, Politique 
Européenne, no.3, January, pp.13-37. 
Sinnot, Richard (1995), „Bringing Public Opinion Back In‟, Niedermayer, Oskar and Sinnott, 
Richard (eds.), Public Opinion and International Governance, Oxford University Press, New 
York. 
Szczerbiak, Aleks, Taggart, Paul  (2000), Opposing Europe: Party Systems and Opposition to 
the Union, the Euro and Europeanisation, Sussex European Institute Working Paper No. 36, 
University of Sussex, Brighton. 
Szemlér, Tamás (1997), The Economic Benefits for Hungary of EU Accession, Working Papers 
No. 98, Institute for World Economics, Budapest. 
Verheugen, Günter (4 March 2003), “A driving force in the reform process Enlargement 
seminar with UK Parliamentarians,” London DN: SPEECH/03/107, www.europa.eu.int/rapid. 
Weimer, David L, Vining, Aidan R. (1992), Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice, Prentice 
Hall, Englewood Cliff, New Jersey. 
Wessels, Bernhard (1995), „Support for Integration: Élite or Mass-Driven?‟, Niedermayer, 
Oskar and Sinnott, Richard (eds.), Public Opinion and International Governance, Oxford 
University Press, New York. 
Westle, Bettina (1995), „The View from Within‟, Niedermayer, Oskar and Sinnott, Richard 
(eds.), Public Opinion and International Governance, Oxford University Press, New York. 
